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This paper explores the implications of economic and political inequality  for the business cycle comovement
of government purchases. We set up and compute a heterogeneous-agent neoclassical growth model,
where households value government purchases which are financed by income taxes.  A key feature
of the model is a wealth bias in the political aggregation process. When calibrated to U.S. wealth inequality
and exposed to aggregate productivity shocks, such a model is able to generate milder procyclicality
of government purchases than models with no political wealth bias. The degree of wealth bias that
matches the observed mild procyclicality of government purchases in the data, is consistent with cross-sectional














ity for the business cycle comovement of government purchases. We deﬁne government pur-
chases as “government expenditures on consumption and investment goods” as in the NIPA
accounts, excluding transfers and interest payments. Notice that in many economic environ-
ments, where government purchases are a normal good, desired government purchases in-
crease in aggregate productivity. The effect from aggregate productivity impacts economic
agents in the same direction and will therefore, in isolation, lead to strongly procyclical govern-
ment purchases. Government purchases are no different than private consumption expendi-
tures in this respect. Unlike the decentralized private consumption choice, however, the choice
ofgovernmentpurchasestypicallyinvolvesanaggregationofindividualpreferences. Economic
and economically-based political inequality may thus be important for aggregate dynamics.
The mechanism that we explore in this paper follows from two properties of standard mod-
els: individually desired government purchases, a normal good, increase in individual wealth.
Therefore, if the political aggregation mechanism is such that in good economic times agents
with lower individual wealth gain political inﬂuence compared to normal times, then the effect
of individual wealth on desired government purchases might dampen the comovement of gov-
ernment purchases and output. We will refer to this effect as decoupling. The second feature
is countercyclical wealth inequality. Agents with lower individual wealth gain more political in-
ﬂuenceinbooms, ifcountercyclicalwealthinequalityiscombinedwithapro-wealthbiasinthe
political decision.
It is well known that income and wealth inequality are an important feature of the U.S.
economy (see Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997) as well as Heathcote et al. (2010) for a comprehen-
sive documentation of economic heterogeneity). A different literature provides direct evidence
of wealth bias in political participation and argues that political inequality due to wealth bias
is crucial in understanding the long-run relationship between economic inequality and pub-
lic policies (see Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, Benabou, 2000, Bartels, 2008, and Campante,
2008). In this paper, we ask whether the joint presence of economic and political inequality is
also important for understanding certain aspects of the business cycle dynamics of public poli-
cies.
As a ﬁrst step, we demonstrate the aforementioned two theoretical properties in a sim-
ple stylized model and show empirically, using political participation data from the American
National Election Studies (ANES), that indeed lower income percentiles tend to have slightly
procyclical relative political inﬂuence, whereas the opposite is the case for higher income per-
centiles. We also provide evidence that government purchases are a normal good. Together
2this means that the conditions for a decoupling of government purchases and the economic
cycle are met, and indeed we ﬁnd that government purchases are robustly the least procyclical
component of aggregate demand. This holds for aggregate government purchases as well as for
most disaggregated data.
In a second step, we ask whether the described mechanism with the interacting normal-
ity property of government purchases and countercyclical political inequality can also gener-
ate mild procyclicality of government purchases in a fully dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model that features quantitatively realistic economic and political inequality. We set up a
stochastic neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets, where the equilibrium wealth
distribution has a realistic concentration. Political inequality is linked to wealth inequality
through the presence of a wealth bias in the political decision making process. We use a “po-
litical power”-weighted social welfare function to endogenously determine public policy. Oth-
erwise, the model is essentially a merger of the representative household model in Klein et al.
(2008) that features endogenous public policy, and the heterogeneous agent model in Krusell
and Smith (1997 and 1998). This means we add to Klein et al. (2008) three features: aggre-
gate uncertainty in the form of aggregate productivity shocks, economic heterogeneity in the
form of persistent idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and – in the spirit of Krusell and
Smith (1997 and 1998) – discount factors, and the parametric speciﬁcation of political wealth
bias from Benabou (2000). Our model features a government that cannot commit ex ante to a
path of government purchases, but takes into account future streams of government purchases
and how they depend on current decisions. The solution concept for the game between suc-
cessive governments is the Markov-perfect equilibrium. Government purchases are ﬁnanced
by income taxes. Like Klein et al. (2008), we abstract from government debt and transfers.
We ﬁnd that the contemporaneous correlation between output and government purchases
is a declining function of the wealth bias in the political system. The degree of wealth bias that
matches this correlation in the data is broadly in line with the campaign contribution shares
by income percentiles reported in the ANES data. We also show that either a lack of political
inequality or a lack of quantitatively realistic wealth inequality, the extreme case of which is a
representative agent version of our model, means that output and government purchases are
too strongly correlated, compared to the data. Models that lack either type of inequality have
essentially approximate aggregation in the sense of Krusell and Smith (1998) and behave very
similarly to the representative agent case.1 Current government purchases in such models are
1Thus one contribution of our paper is to compute and analyze successive extensions of the Klein et al. (2008)
modeloftime-consistentgovernmentpolicywithaggregateuncertaintyandeconomicandpoliticalheterogeneity.
Numerically, we use the algorithm in Krusell and Smith (1998) and show that approximating the wealth distribu-
tion and its law of motion by a ﬁnite number of moments can also be applied to politico-economic equilibrium
modelswithuninsurablelaborincomeriskandaggregateshocks. Wealsoprovidenewﬁndingsastowhichclasses
3mainly determined by the intertemporal trade-off between private and government consump-
tion today and tomorrow, the wealth effect from aggregate productivity. By contrast, a very
unequal wealth distribution intensiﬁes disagreement about the optimal level of government
purchases that, if funneled through political inequality, can cause a partial decoupling of ag-
gregate government purchases and output. As in the data, in the model the political weight of
the wealth-poorest is procyclical and that of the wealth-richest is countercyclical. To be clear:
we do not mean to say that ours is the only conceivable mechanism that could explain the mild
procyclicality of government purchases.2 But in standard economic environments it is a conse-
quence of quantitatively realistic economic and political inequality.
Related Literature
Besides the intrinsic link to the literature on wealth heterogeneity and political wealth bias,
our paper is most closely related to the literature on endogenous government purchases in dy-
namic environments. This is a quantitative macro literature that starts from an otherwise stan-
dard neoclassical growth model and uses a Markov-perfect equilibrium concept to endogenize
government purchases (see Klein et al., 2008, Azzimonti, 2009, and Debortoli and Nunes, 2010).
This literature has so far focussed mostly on long-run steady state analyses, and has also ab-
stracted from economic or political heterogeneity. Recently, Battaglini and Coate (2008b) and
Azzimonti et al. (2008), building on earlier work in Battaglini and Coate (2008a), have devel-
oped a general framework to characterize ﬁscal policies under legislative bargaining and with
aggregate uncertainty. This literature does not have the neoclassical growth model set up in its
economic part. For instance, they use a utility function that is linear in private consumption,
they abstract from capital accumulation and wealth inequality which is the central focus of our
framework. While this literature is much richer than our paper in some dimensions in that it
deals with multidimensional government policies, these simpliﬁcations might limit its useful-
nessforquantitativeanalysis. Inaddition,wecomplementtheirworkbystudyingthedynamics
of government purchases in a probabilistic voting and a majority voting environment.
of heterogeneous agent models feature approximate aggregation. Conversely, we provide a realistically calibrated,
quantitative example with at least a small quantitative deviation from approximate aggregation in the sense of
Krusell and Smith (1998). Indeed, our equilibrium laws of motion contain the Gini coefﬁcient of the wealth distri-
bution in addition to the average wealth. We show that introducing this higher moment into the equilibrium laws
of motion slightly changes the equilibrium dynamics of the model, especially the comovement between output
and government purchases.
2Debortoli and Nunes (2010), using a representative agent model, introduce an additional aggregate shock in
the political system and ﬁnd a lower contemporaneous correlation between government purchases and output
than in models with one aggregate shock.
4In addition, our paper is also related to three other strands of the literature. Methodologi-
cally, webuildontheframeworkdevelopedintheliteratureondynamicpoliticaleconomy, e.g.,
Krusell et al. (1997), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999), Hassler et al. (2003), Hassler et al. (2005),
Song et al. (2007), Corbae et al. (2009), Bai and Lagunoff (2010). Secondly, this paper com-
plements the literature on procyclical ﬁscal policy in developing countries that focuses on in-
ternational aspects such as sovereign borrowing constraints and dysfunctional democracy (see
Ilzetzki (2007), Alesina et al. (2008), and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) for an overview). Thirdly, our
paper is related to the literature with ﬁscal policy in incomplete markets, such as Heathcote
(2005) and Gomes et al. (2008).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section two sets up the economic envi-
ronment and, with the help of a simple model, describes the main causal mechanism behind
decoupling. It also provides data evidence behind this mechanism. Section three describes
the equilibrium concept, the political aggregation mechanism, computation and calibration
of the quantitative model. Section four presents the results from numerical simulations and
some robustness checks. Proofs, more facts about government purchases, computational and
numerical details are relegated to several appendices.
2 Motivation: Simple Models - Stylized Facts
In this section, we describe the main mechanism by which economic and political inequality
inﬂuencethedynamicsofgovernmentpurchasesinthefully-ﬂedgedquantitativeanddynamic
model in Section 3. We ﬁrst show in a simple static model that in a standard economic envi-
ronment desired government purchases of an arbitrary economic agent are an increasing func-
tion of aggregate productivity and individual wealth. The response to aggregate productivity
makes government purchases positively correlated with output and private consumption. If
the political aggregation mechanism is such that in booms wealth-poorer agents gain political
inﬂuence compared to normal times, then the effect of individual wealth on desired govern-
ment purchases might dampen the comovement of government purchases and output. Our
second result concerns the cyclicality of wealth inequality. We show in a two-period version of
the static model that if the third derivative of the consumption felicity function is positive then
under some conditions wealth inequality can be expected to be countercyclical. If this result
is coupled with a pro-wealth bias in the political decision about government purchases, then
agents with lower individual wealth will gain more political inﬂuence in booms. We then pro-
videstylizedfactsfromdatathatsupportdecouplingaswellasthesketchedcausalmechanism.
52.1 Simple Models
2.1.1 A One-Period Model
Let us ﬁrst study the (hypothetical) decision problem of an agent who values private consump-
tion, c, and government purchases, G. The agent is endowed with ˜ l units of time, labor pro-
ductivity, ², and an initial capital stock, k, which depreciates at rate ±. The agent receives factor
incomefromcompetitivecapitalrentalandlabormarkets,subjecttoalinearincometax,atrate
¿(G), which is a function of government purchases.
max
c,G





0Çµ Ç1, andu1(c)aswellasu2(G)areincreasing, strictlyconcaveanddifferentiablefunctions.
Notice that we write this problem as if the agent were to decide about both private consump-
tion and government purchases. This will in general not be the case. Instead,G will be decided
in a political aggregation mechanism, through a constitution (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3). How-
ever, this hypothetical decision problem allows us to introduce the concept of privately desired
government purchases, ˆ G.
To close the model, we assume that the economy is populated by a continuum of such
agents with potentially different labor productivities and capital stock endowments, that there
exists an aggregate Cobb-Douglas constant-returns-to-scale technology to produce output and
that the government has to balance its budget:
Y Æ zK ®L1¡®, where K Æ
Z 1
0







z is an aggregate productivity shock and the only source of aggregate uncertainty. Competi-
tivefactormarketsguaranteetheusualfactorpriceconditions: w (K,L,z)Æ(1¡®)z(K/L)® and
r (K,L,z)Æ®z(K/L)®¡1.
A re-write of the budget constraint illustrates the sources of conﬂicting policy preferences.
Plugging the tax function ¿(K,L,z,G) into the budget constraint and re-arranging terms, yields:
c Åp(k,²;K,L)G Æ(1¡±)k Åp(k,²;K,L)zK ®L1¡®, (4)
where
p(k,²;K,L)´








6can be viewed as the individual-speciﬁc relative price of G measured in units of private con-
sumptionforahouseholdwithcharacteristic(k,²). Fromthisperspective,thedecisionproblem





relative price does not depend on aggregate technology, because z proportionally increases the
income of every household and hence brings no change in relative income.
Theeffectofachangein z andk ontheprivatedemandforG, denotedby b G(k,²;K,L,z), can
now be readily analyzed and summarized in the following3
Proposition 1 b G(k,²;K,L,z) is strictly increasing in z. If u1(c) has the CRRA form, c°
° , ° · 0 and
± · 1, with one inequality holding strictly, then b G(k,²;K,L,z) is strictly increasing in k. In the
case of linear consumption felicity, ° Æ 1, b G(k,²;K,L,z) is strictly decreasing in k, while it does
not change in z.
The intuition behind this result is that with °Æ1 there is no income effect, so an increase in
individual capital holdings through an increase in the relative price of government purchases
will only lead to a substitution effect. The lower °, the stronger the income effect that makes
agents want to demand more G. The proposition is important because it predicts for parame-
ters that are standard in quantitative macroeconomics that wealth-richer agents demand more
government purchases.
The proposition highlights two channels for the dynamics of government purchases over
the business cycles. A higher technology shock tends to increaseG, which in isolation makesG
procyclical. Thisproductivity-inducedwealtheffectdoesnotrequireheterogeneityofagents. It
is present even if all agents are the same. But heterogeneity in capital endowments may gener-
ate an additional channel if wealth inequality changes over the business cycles and the political
system exhibits a wealth bias in the aggregation of preferences over government purchases.
For instance, with a pro-wealth bias, a decrease in wealth inequality operating through a sim-
ilar change in political inequality might move the policy outcome towards the preference of
poorerpeople,hence–assuming b G(k,²;K,L,z)increasesink –towardsalowerlevelofG. Other
things equal, the higher the wealth bias, the larger is this effect. Compared to a representative
agent model with only the productivity-induced wealth effect present, countercyclical wealth
inequality would then dampen the positive comovement of G with the economic cycle. In the
next subsection we extend the model to two periods, allowing for a nontrivial saving decision,
and argue that with a positive third derivative of the consumption felicity function, there is a
tendency in such models to produce countercyclical wealth inequality.
3Proofs of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix A.
72.1.2 A Two-Period Model
In this subsection we focus on the relation between aggregate economic conditions and wealth
inequality in a simple two-period production economy. Agents discount the future at rate ¯
and use ﬂow utility (1). The budget constraint now reads, suppressing for ease of notation the
dependence of w, r and ¿ on macro variables:
c Åk0 Æ(1¡±)k Å(1¡¿)(w˜ l²Årk). (6)
The following proposition shows that under certain conditions and in a certain sense it can
beshownanalyticallythatourtwo-periodproductioneconomyfeaturescountercyclicalwealth
inequality.
Proposition 2 If u1(c) has a positive third derivative, hence in particular for a CRRA speciﬁca-
tion, an exogenous increase in today’s real wage (keeping other macro variables constant), de-
creases the Gini coefﬁcient of second-period capital holdings for a group of agents with the same
labor productivity, but different initial capital holdings.
It is instructive to discuss the conditions in the statement of the proposition in turn. The
positivethirdderivativeofconsumptionfelicityisastandardassumptioninquantitativemacro-
economics and needs no further comment. The scenario we have in mind is to “simulate a
boom”throughanexogenousincreaseintherealwageinapartialequilibriumenvironment. Of
course, in a micro-founded general equilibrium model this can only be brought about through
a change in an exogenous variable, typically aggregate productivity z. However, the statement
cannot analytically be shown to hold for increases in aggregate productivity, for two reasons.
First, aggregate productivity increases lead, via changes in aggregate capital accumulation, to
changes in tomorrow’s factor prices. Secondly, even ignoring these general equilibrium effects,
weshowintheproofofthepropositionthatsimultaneouschangesin w andr leadingeneralto
ambiguouseffectsoninequality. Finally,theanalyticalderivationofourstatementrequiresthat
inequality in second-period capital holdings is generated by a speciﬁc source of heterogeneity,
namely different initial capital holdings. We found it impossible to derive a clear statement in
the presence of higher dimensional heterogeneity.
Nevertheless, the proposition shows that in the class of models we study there exists at least
one force towards countercyclical wealth inequality. It is a quantitative question, whether this
force will prevail in a fully-ﬂedged dynamic and realistically calibrated model. This justiﬁes our
use of numerical methods.
82.2 Stylized Facts
Inthissubsection,weﬁrstshowthatgovernmentpurchasesareprocyclical,butlesssothanany
other component of domestic aggregate demand. We then provide further, cross-sectional evi-
dence from U.S. state data that government purchases are a normal good. We ﬁnish by showing
that political inequality as measured by voter turnout and the incidence of campaign contri-
butions by income percentiles is not only prevalent in the U.S., but also mildly countercyclical.
This is micro evidence in support of the decoupling mechanism.
Figure 1 shows the cyclical components of two measures of annual government purchases
on goods and services alongside the cyclical component of U.S. GDP.4 We study government
consumption and gross investment including defense spending (G), and government nonde-
fense consumption and gross investment (GND). Both measures of government purchases are
clearly procyclical.
Figure 1: Cyclicality of Government Purchases



















































Notes: Y denotes GDP , G government consumption and gross investment expenditures and GND government
nondefense consumption and gross investment expenditures. All variables are annual, they range from 1960-
2006. They are deﬂated by their corresponding deﬂators, logged and ﬁltered with a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with
smoothing parameter 100.
We complement the graphical analysis by a second moment analysis in Table 1. Govern-
ment purchases are the least procyclical component of domestic aggregate demand. In partic-
ular, private consumption expenditures are much more correlated with aggregate output than
4Annual data on government purchases correspond closely to the yearly nature of government budgeting and
therefore we focus on this frequency. Quarterly data on government purchases display a similar decoupling prop-
erty. We start our analysis in 1960 to exclude the Korean war.
9governmentpurchases. Thisisalsoreﬂectedinarelativelylowcorrelationcoefﬁcientofgovern-
mentpurchaseswithprivateconsumptionexpendituresandthe(mild)countercyclicalityofthe
government-purchases-to-GDP-ratio. Two additional properties of government purchases dy-
namics can be seen from Table 1. Unlike the other two components of aggregate demand, the
dynamiccorrelationsofgovernmentpurchaseswithlaggedoutputarehigherthanthecontem-
poraneous correlations. Secondly, government purchases are the most persistent component
of domestic aggregate demand, and they are also more persistent than output.
Table 1: BUSINESS CYCLE FACTS OF GOVERNMENT PURCHASES
Moment Correl. w. Y Correl. w. Y-Lag. Correl. w. C Autocorrel. 1st-order
Y 1.00 0.54 0.87 0.54
C 0.87 0.41 1.00 0.62
I 0.84 0.21 0.69 0.42
GND 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.74
G 0.35 0.51 0.35 0.79
GND
Y -0.23 0.12 -0.14 0.74
G
Y -0.11 0.13 -0.09 0.86
Notes: see notes to Figure 1. C denotes private consumption expenditures and I private gross ﬁxed investment. All
variables are annual, they range from 1960-2006. They are deﬂated by their corresponding deﬂators. All variables





hold along the consumption/investment distinction, along political subdivisions – federal ver-
sus state and local governments – and when government purchases are disaggregated into de-
fense and nondefense spending. Government employment behaves similarly to government
purchases. They also hold along the functional disaggregation from NIPA table 3.15.5. Finally,
the government purchases of most of the 50 U.S. states are mildly positively correlated with
the cyclical component of the state’s GDP. And the correlation of the states’ G with their lagged
output typically exceeds the contemporaneous correlation.5
As is evident from both the aggregate and disaggregated data, the procyclical movement of
government purchases suggests that it is a normal good: as income increases, the demand for
governmentpurchasesrises. Thisfactcanalsobeseenfromthecross-sectionalvariationacross
U.S. states. Average government purchases comove positively with per capita state-level GDP,
5See Tables 7 and 8 as well as Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix B. The two most noticeable exceptions are federal
nondefense purchases, which is only roughly 12% of all purchases and acyclical, and, along the functional disag-
gregation, health spending, which is roughly 4.5% of total government purchases and mildly countercyclical.
10when we control for the states’ surface and population.6 This shown in Figure 2.7
Figure 2: The Correlation Between States’ GDP Per Capita and Government Purchases






















NIPA Data − Correlation=0.6




















Notes: ‘Real State G’ in the upper panel is real GDP from the total government sector in the regional NIPA data.
‘Real State G’ in the lower panel is the sum of the expenditures on ‘Total Current Operations’ and ‘Total Capital
Outlays’ from the historical data of the census of state government ﬁnances, deﬂated by the state-speciﬁc implicit
deﬂator for government GDP from the NIPA data. ‘Real State GDP per capita’ is real GDP from the regional NIPA
data. All data are averaged across time. These averaged ‘Real State G’ data are regressed on the states’ total surface
and population. The residuals of these regressions are displayed against ‘Real State GDP per capita’.
We ﬁnish this section by providing some direct evidence on the presence of pro-wealth (or
rather pro-income) bias in the political process, using political participation data. In Table 2
we report the fraction of people who vote and make campaign contributions and belong to a
certain percentile of the income distribution.8 For instance the richest 5% represent 6.7% of
6Itisreasonable to assumethatstateswitha larger surfacehave differenttransportationneeds, whichis why we
control for the states’ surface. The effect of including this control is, however, quantitatively small. We also control
for population because part of the government purchases in the data may include partially rival goods. Figure 10
in Appendix B takes the opposite view, i.e. completely non-rivalrous government purchases, and repeats the same
exercisefor theraw dataonstate-level governmentpurchasesandper capitastate-level GDPwithoutany controls.
We still ﬁnd a positive correlation, albeit somewhat mitigated.
7Figure 11 in Appendix B repeats the same exercise as in Figure 2 with essentially the same results for the state
and local government sector in the regional NIPA data, and for the census data, disaggregated for ‘Total Current
Operations’ (consumption) and ‘Total Capital Outlays’ (investment). Also, one may wonder whether the positive
correlationbetweenpercapitastate-levelGDPandstate-levelgovernmentpurchasesissimplydrivenbytheright-
most data point, the state with the highest per capita income on average, Alaska. In a robustness check, where we
exclude Alaska and Delaware (the second richest state), we show that this is not the case, although quantitatively
the positive connection is reduced: the correlation for NIPA data goes down to 0.44, the one for Census data de-
creases to 0.36.
8The somewhat nonstandard partition of the income distribution is given by ANES. We start from the same
data source as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Benabou (2000) in his table 1, but use a somewhat different
11votersand17.5%ofcampaigncontributors. Incontrast, thepoorest16%makeuponly13.1%of
voters and 5% of campaign contributors. Given a strong positive correlation between income
and wealth, the data also suggests an underlying pro-wealth bias in the political system, i.e., a
positive correlation between wealth and political representation. To the extent that richer peo-
ple give a larger amount when they do contribute to political candidates, the participation rate
data of campaign contributions, which represents only an extensive margin, may well underes-
timate the actual inequality in political inﬂuence. The suggested pro-wealth participation pat-
tern in the data motivates our model speciﬁcation with a built-in positive link between wealth
and political power.
Table 2: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION PER INCOME GROUP
Income Percentile [0¡16%] [17¡33%] [34¡67%] [68¡95%] [96¡100%]
Voting shares 13.1% 14.4% 33.6% 32.2% 6.7%
Campaign contribution shares 5.0% 8.1% 27.5% 41.9% 17.5%
Notes: ‘Voting shares’ are the average fractions of voters that belong to a certain percentile of the income distribu-
tion. ‘Campaign contribution shares’ are the average fractions of campaign contributors that belong to a certain
percentile of the income distribution. Data source is the American National Election Studies (ANES). See Rosen-
stone and Hansen (1993), Appendix B, for a precise wording of the survey questions. We use data from 1960-2000.
We report the comovement properties of the measured inequality in political participation
in Table 3. The correlation patterns of the lowest and highest percentile are at least consistent
with countercyclical political inequality. During an economic boom, the political representa-
tionforthelower-income(higher-income)groupdisplaysatendencytorise(decrease). Asare-
sult,thepoliticalrepresentationshiftsslightlyfromthehighertailtothelowertailoftheincome
distribution during good times, and vice versa. Our preferred speciﬁcation of the quantitative
model will also exhibit these rather small positive correlation numbers for the lower income
percentiles and rather small negative correlation numbers for the higher income percentiles.
time horizon, 1960-2000, which explains the very small quantitative differences in our results. We had access until
the 2004 data of the ANES, but the 2002 data along income percentiles were missing, which is why we restrict the
analysis to 1960-2000.
12Table 3: CYCLICALITY OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION PER INCOME GROUP
Income Percentile [0¡16%] [96¡100%]
Voting Shares
Correl. w. Y 0.14 -0.05
Correl. w. GND 0.24 -0.21
Correl. w. G 0.18 -0.45
Campaign Contribution Shares
Correl. w. Y 0.08 -0.22
Correl. w. GND 0.22 -0.11
Correl. w. G 0.32 -0.24
Notes: see notes to Figure 1 and Table 2. Since the ANES data are only biannual, we ﬁlter the annual data for Y , G
andGND ﬁrst and then use only the biannual deviations from trend.
3 The Quantitative Model
In this section, we build on the model from Section 2.1 and use numerical methods to study a
calibrateddynamicstochasticgeneralequilibriummodelwithheterogeneousagentsandquan-
titatively realistic economic and political inequality. We ﬁrst brieﬂy add what is necessary to
specify the economic environment in this quantitative model. Then we deﬁne the equilib-
rium concept with endogenous public policy. The ensuing subsection describes the political
aggregation mechanism. We ﬁnish with a discussion of the computation and calibration of the
model.
3.1 The Dynamic Economic Environment
Section 2 speciﬁed the main ingredients of a standard heterogeneous household stochastic
growth model, as in Krusell and Smith (1998). In the fully dynamic economy, inﬁnitely lived
households face persistent idiosyncratic shocks to their labor efﬁciency, ². This leads to id-
iosyncratic labor income risk to which households partially insure using physical capital as the
only asset. Idiosyncratic labor efﬁciency shocks are a standard assumption in the incomplete
markets literature (see, e.g., Huggett, 1993, and Aiyagari, 1994), because they give rise to a non-
degenerate wealth distribution. In order to generate quantitatively realistic wealth inequality,
we again follow Krusell and Smith (1998) and assume that households face persistent idiosyn-
cratic shocks to their discount factor. We will show that matching the inequality in the U.S.
wealth distribution is crucial for understanding the dynamics of government purchases in our
model. We ﬁnally specify the felicity function (1) as a log-log form:
13U (c,G)Æµlog(c)Å(1¡µ)log(G). (7)
The budget constraint is given by (6), with an additional borrowing constraint k0
i 2 [k,Å1).
We assume that the two sources of heterogeneity, ² and ¯, evolve according to discrete Markov
chains, independently of each other and across agents.9 Similarly, z, i.e. aggregate productiv-
ity, evolves according to a discrete Markov chain, which is independent from the two Markov
processes that govern the idiosyncratic stochastic environment.
3.2 Dynamic Equilibrium with Endogenous Public Policy
In choosing government purchases, G, the government faces – on top of the balanced bud-
get requirement – two institutional constraints. First, the government chooses G under the
constraints of social choice institutions. Some examples of social choice institutions are the
utilitarian social planner and a majority voting system, although we are going to study more
general mechanisms in the next subsection. For the purpose of deﬁning an equilibrium, how-





mapsthepreferencesofeachhousehold, Ji,totheequilibriumchoice. Ji denotesinnetpresent
value terms the indirect utility function of each household over alternative policy proposals. It
is formally deﬁned below.
Second, the government cannot commit to a stream of future policies. Without a commit-
mentdevice, itiswellknownthatthecommitmentequilibriuminourenvironmentisnottime-
consistent. Time consistency requires imposing a subgame-perfect restriction with successive
governments and the households as game players. Following Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) and
Klein et al. (2008), we focus on a subclass of subgame-perfect equilibrium with Markov strate-
gies, i.e., Markov-perfect Equilibrium (MPE).10 Adapted to our heterogeneous agent environ-





, denoted by ¡. With the choice of these state variables, the MPE is de-
ﬁned in terms of continuation value functions and best response functions under a one-shot
deviation. Loosely speaking, MPE is achieved if these objects satisfy standard requirements of
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (RCE) on the equilibrium path, and best-response consis-
tency on the off-equilibrium path. The formal deﬁnition follows.
9Since ² is uncorrelated across households, and by the continuum assumption, L is a constant owing to the
law of large numbers. We therefore suppress it as an argument in the real wage, the real interest rate and the tax
function.
10By construction, this class of Markov-perfect Equilibrium rules out the reputational equilibria with history-
dependent strategies. For examples of equilibria with trigger strategy and reputation, see Aguiar and Amador
(2009). For studies of constrained efﬁcient policies with political economy frictions, see Acemoglu, Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2009), Farhi and Werning (2008), and Yared (2010).
14Deﬁnition 1 AMarkov-perfectEquilibriumfortheeconomyisasetoffunctions,includingagov-
ernment policy function G Æ ª(¡,z), a distribution transition function ¡0 Æ H (¡,z,G), an equi-
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and the exogenous stochastic processes.









The ﬁrst part of the equilibrium deﬁnition says that h is the best response of the household
to an arbitrary change in current G when the future follows the equilibrium path, a so-called
one-shot deviation best response. J denotes the corresponding value function. In addition,
the best-response value function should coincide with the equilibrium continuation function
when evaluated at the equilibrium policy G Æª(¡,z). The second part requires that the evolu-
tion of the aggregate distribution, H (¡,z,G), is generated by the households’ best responses for
any given G and the exogenous stochastic processes. This reﬂects rational expectations on the
household side. On the equilibrium path, this requirement reduces to the familiar consistency
restriction in RCE. In addition, MPE imposes the same requirement for off-equilibrium paths.




153.3 The Social Choice Mechanism













where Â 2 R is a given institutional parameter reﬂecting characteristics of the political process
and kÅ
i ´max[0,ki].11 The government chooses public policy so as to maximize a weighted so-
cial welfare function, with weights dependent on the wealth of the households. The weighting
function, (kÅ
i )Â, is meant to be a ﬂexible parametric form to capture wealth bias in the politi-
cal process. If Â Æ 0, every household is treated equally, which leads to the familiar egalitarian
social welfare function. A positive (negative) value of Â implies a pro-wealth (anti-wealth) bias
in the political process, since a larger (smaller) weight is assigned to a household with a higher
positive wealth. As the absolute value of Â increases, the degree of wealth bias becomes larger.
Intuitively, a higher wealth bias increases the responsiveness of political weights to wealth in-
equality, hence implies a higher political inequality. In fact, this intuition can be proved for-
mally when the political inequality is measured in terms of the Lorenz curve (see Bai and La-
gunoff, 2009, for a formal proof and a general characterization of related weighting functions).
There are different interpretations of our baseline public choice mechanism. From a nor-
mative aspect, the weighted social welfare function approach can be viewed as a social plan-
ner’s problem. As we show in Appendix C, there is also a micro-founded positive interpretation,
which is generated by a political process in a probabilistic voting environment.12 There the
weighting function, (kÅ
i )Â, can be attributed to a pro-wealth vote allocation in a weighted vot-
ing system. We thus extend the well-known result in the literature that political decision mak-
ing via a standard unbiased utilitarian welfare function is equivalent to probabilistic voting (see
Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987) to a dynamic set up and the case of wealth-biased probabilistic
voting.
11See Benabou (2000) and Bai and Lagunoff (2009). Using kÅ
i is a convenient way to avoid negative weights in
the welfare function. We also experimented with a weighting function that depends on total available resources,
(ki ¡k)Â, and found that the results are not dependent on this functional form.
12In Section 4.2 we study a pro-wealth majority voting environment.
163.4 Computation
Whether the partial decoupling mechanism outlined in Section 2 is economically signiﬁcant,
is a quantitative question. We thus use numerical methods to characterize and analyze the
Markov-perfect equilibria of our economy. In computing the equilibria, we face the usual prac-
tical challenges introduced by the heterogeneous-agent economic environment, as well as new
complications due to the endogenous policy determination.
On a conceptual level, we need to adapt the ﬁxed-point iteration procedure used in com-
puting RCE to account for the best-response consistency of off-equilibrium paths. As already
intimated in our equilibrium deﬁnition, our procedure iterates on the best response transition
function and policy function (H,ª) to reach a ﬁxed point. Both on and off equilibrium restric-
tions are honored in every step of the computation.
On a practical level, we have to specify a set of moments of the wealth distribution and
functional forms for (H,ª) to implement the general procedure proposed in Krusell and Smith
(1998). They ﬁnd that average capital is sufﬁcient to approximate the inﬁnite-dimensional
wealth distribution and its law of motion and, thus, to forecast future prices. In our case, be-
cause of the public choice nature of ﬁscal policy higher-order statistics might matter for the
evolution of the economy. This intuition is veriﬁed in our simulations. We ﬁnd that the com-
bination of average capital and the Gini coefﬁcient of the capital distribution is sufﬁcient to
characterizetheevolutionofoureconomy, yetatthesametimekeepsthedimensionalityofthe
problem tractable.13 The computed ﬁxed point of H then takes the following form:14








and that of ª takes the form of
logG Æb0(z)Åb1(z)logK Åb2(z)logGini(k). (11)
Notice that the parameters of these equations depend on the (discrete) level of aggregate pro-
ductivity. We solve the MPE using a ﬁxed point iteration procedure from the parameters in
(9)-(11) onto themselves. The computational algorithm is outlined in detail in Appendix D. The
parameterized Krusell and Smith rules and their performance are shown in Appendix F.
13We also experimented with the standard deviation of the wealth distribution, but found better R2 improve-
ments with the Gini coefﬁcient.
14It turns out that
¡
logG
¢2 improves the ﬁt of the law of motion for capital signiﬁcantly.
173.5 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match features of the U.S. economy from 1960 to 2006. Annual data
ongovernmentpurchasescorrespondcloselytotheyearlynatureofgovernmentbudgetingand
therefore we calibrate our model to this frequency. This choice immediately implies three pa-
rameterselections: thedepreciationrate, ±, issetto0.1; thediscountrate, ¯, iscenteredaround
0.96; and we model aggregate productivity, z, as a ﬁve-state Markov chain that approximates a
log-AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coefﬁcient of 0.8145 and conditional standard devi-
ation of 0.0165. This standard deviation is chosen to make our models approximately match
the annual percentage standard deviation of GDP in the data, 1.90%. This paper is not about
explaining output volatility from a measured exogenous shock series, as in the RBC tradition
which uses ﬂuctuations in the Solow residual to generate a large part of observed output ﬂuc-
tuations. Rather, this paper is concerned with shedding light on the comovement properties
of government purchases and the overall economic cycle, given the right output volatility. The
ﬁnal standard parameter is the output elasticity of capital, ®Æ0.36.
Idiosyncratic labor efﬁciency, ², is modeled as a nine-state Markov chain that approximates
a log-AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coefﬁcient of 0.75 and conditional standard devia-
tionof0.18. ThesenumbersarebroadlyconsistentwiththeestimatesfromGuvenenandSmith
(2008) who use an indirect inference approach and data on labor income, labor supply and
consumption to estimate a model for the natural logarithm of labor income. We set ˜ l Æ0.33.
We assume that the discount factor evolves according to a persistent three-state Markov
chain pinned down by four conditions: 1) at every point in time the majority of the population
(80%) has ¯Æ0.96, and the very patient and very impatient agents have a mass of 10% each; 2)
the average duration of a given discount factor is 50 years, which is meant to capture a dynastic
element in this inﬁnite horizon model; 3) agents do not jump over a state; 4) the equidistant
difference between the three grid points is calibrated jointly with the borrowing constraint, k,
to be broadly consistent with the fraction of households with negative wealth in U.S. data and
theGinicoefﬁcientoftheU.S.wealthdistribution. Thiscalibrationstrategyaswellasitstargets,
11% for the fraction of negative net wealth holders and 0.79 for the Gini coefﬁcient, is taken
from Krusell and Smith (1998) and adapted to the annual frequency. We ﬁnd that given the
above labor income process a small borrowing constraint of 0.01 and the following grid for ¯ is
broadly consistent with the calibration targets: [0.94,0.96,0.98]. Appendix E displays the exact
speciﬁcations of the three Markov chains for z, ² and ¯.
Twoparametersremaintobecalibrated: µ, theweightongovernmentpurchases; andÂ, the
exponent of the weighting function in the political aggregation mechanism. For µ we adopt the
following baseline strategy: given the set of parameters above and a value for Â, we choose µ so
18thatthemodelmatchesthetime-averaged G
Y -ratiobasedonaggregatenondefensegovernment
purchases, GND, i.e. roughly 15%.15 We thus follow the empirical literature that views only
defense government purchases as a truly exogenous stochastic process and uses this assump-
tion for the identiﬁcation of the economic consequences of government spending shocks. Of
course, since this paper is about endogenous government purchases we simply take the com-
plement, i.e. nondefense government purchases. We check for robustness with respect to this
target choice in Section 4.2. For Â we take no a priori stance and rather vary Â parametrically.
Wedo,however,arguethatthepoliticalinequalityofourpreferredmodel,isbroadlyinlinewith
the political participation data in Table 2, Section 2.2.
4 Results
4.1 The Baseline Result
In this section, we show that decoupling between government purchases and the overall cycle
increases with the degree of wealth-bias in the political system, parameterized by the exponent
in the political weight function. Starting from the case with no wealth bias in the social welfare
function – every agent in the economy has the same political weight – we increase Â and plot
in Figure 3 the contemporaneous correlation coefﬁcient between output and government pur-
chases. We do this for the baseline computation/calibration and three variants: ﬁrst, we simply
leave out the Gini coefﬁcient in the Krusell-Smith rules for capital and government purchases
(“No Gini in KS rule” - dashed line), and recompute the equilibrium; secondly, we do not tar-
get a realistic Gini coefﬁcient in the simulated wealth distribution and set the discount factor
deterministically to its median value of 0.96, but leave the higher moment in the Krusell-Smith
rules (dashed-dotted line); thirdly, we combine both changes (dotted line).16
The comovement between output and government purchases declines with the degree of
wealthbiasinthebaselinecase. AtavalueofÂÆ0.55themodelmatchestheobservedcontem-
poraneous comovement between government purchases and output almost exactly. Compar-
ing the baseline simulation with the Gini coefﬁcient in the Krusell-Smith rules and the recom-
putedequilibriumwithoutanyhighermomentsrevealsaquantitativelyrealisticexamplewhere
there is at least a small deviation from approximate aggregation in the sense of Krusell and
Smith (1998). Using a measure of wealth inequality in the equilibrium law of motion changes
actual equilibrium dynamics slightly for higher political bias parameters - the solid and the
15Appendix E provides the values of µ for the different models.
16TheresultingGinicoefﬁcientis0.46andthefractionofnegativewealthholdersis2.8%acrossmodels, whether
we use the Gini coefﬁcient or not in the Krusell-Smith rules.
19Figure 3: Correlation Between Y andG as a Function of Wealth Bias in the Baseline Calibration



















































No Gini in KS rule
Deterministic β
Deterministic β − No Gini in KS rule
Notes: In the simulations, all variables are logged and ﬁltered with a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing pa-
rameter 100. The simulation numbers come from a simulation of 1500 periods, where the ﬁrst 500 periods were
discarded. The simulation is started from an arbitrary initial wealth distribution. All simulations use the same
series of aggregate shocks. ‘No Gini in KS rule’ refers to the equilibrium, when we simply leave out the Gini coefﬁ-
cient in the Krusell-Smith rules for capital and government purchases. ‘Deterministic ¯’ refers to the equilibrium,
when we make the discount factor deterministic and set it to its median value 0.96, but continue to use the Gini
coefﬁcient in the Krusell-Smith rules for capital and government purchases. ‘Deterministic ¯ - No Gini in KS rule’
refers to the equilibrium with deterministic ¯ and no Gini coefﬁcient in the Krusell-Smith rules.
dashed line deviate from each other for higher Â. When agents do not take into account the
dynamics of wealth inequality in their forecasting rules, the decoupling effect that a highly
unequal wealth distribution in concert with a wealth-biased political system brings about is
slightly mitigated. The contemporaneous correlation between output and government pur-
chases increases from 0.48 to 0.56, when the Gini coefﬁcient is left out. Figure 3 also shows that
using a counterfactual wealth distribution with mild economic inequality nearly eliminates the
effect of wealth bias on aggregate government purchases dynamics, whether we include higher
momentsintheforecastingrulesornot. Finally, inthecaseofcompletepoliticalequality, ÂÆ0,
the extent of economic heterogeneity seems irrelevant for aggregate dynamics.
Table 4, which analyzes the baseline speciﬁcation with Â Æ 0.55 more closely, shows that
when the mildly positive contemporaneous correlation between government purchases and
output is matched (data moments are in brackets), then also the contemporaneous correlation
between government purchases and private consumption is relatively low, and the same holds
trueforthecorrelationbetweengovernmentpurchasesandlaggedoutput. Inparticularthetwo
outputcorrelationshavethecorrectrelativesize. Ourmodelisalsoconsistentwithgovernment
20Table 4: BASELINE SIMULATION RESULTS - ÂÆ0.55
Moment Correl. w. Y Correl. w. Y-Lag. Correl. w. C Autocorrel. 1st-order
Y 1.00 (1.00) 0.51 (0.54) 0.93 (0.87) 0.51 (0.54)
C 0.93 (0.87) 0.69 (0.41) 1.00 (1.00) 0.65 (0.62)
I 0.97 (0.84) 0.34 (0.21) 0.81 (0.69) 0.45 (0.42)
GND 0.48 (0.47) 0.74 (0.58) 0.75 (0.49) 0.85 (0.74)
GND
Y -0.78 (-0.23) -0.32 (0.12) -0.66 (-0.14) 0.75 (0.74)
Notes: see notes to Table 1 and Figure 3. Data moments are in brackets.
purchases being the most persistent component of aggregate demand.17 As it is in the data, it
is also more persistent than aggregate output. Finally, the model matches at least qualitatively
all but one sign of the cyclicality of the G
Y -ratio.
Table 5: SIMULATION RESULTS - THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL HETEROGENEITY
Moment Baseline ÂÆ0 Determ. ¯ Rep. Agent Rep. Agent Data
(ÂÆ0.55) ÂÆ0.55 No Lag Lag
G
Correl. w. Y 0.48 0.99 0.92 0.97 0.43 0.47
Correl. w. Y-Lag. 0.74 0.60 0.70 0.66 0.97 0.58
Correl. w. C 0.75 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.70 0.49
Autocorrel. 1st-order 0.85 0.57 0.67 0.62 0.61 0.74
C
Correl. w. Y 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.87
Autocorrel. 1st-order 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.62
Notes: see notes to table 4. ‘Baseline’ refers to the heterogeneous agent model with wealth bias parameter ÂÆ0.55.
Â Æ 0 is a model without any wealth bias, i.e. political inequality, in the social welfare function. ‘Determ. ¯’ refers
to a case, when we make the discount factor deterministic and set it to its median value 0.96, but continue to use
the Gini coefﬁcient in the Krusell-Smith rules for capital and government purchases. We essentially keep the same
parameter for political inequality as in the baseline case, i.e. Â Æ 0.55, but reduce the extent of wealth inequality.
‘Rep. Agent No Lag’ refers to a simulation, where we abstract from any heterogeneity, i.e. ² and ¯ are held con-
stant, and the political decision is about current government purchases. ‘Rep. Agent Lag’ refers to a simulation,
where where we abstract from any heterogeneity and the political decision about government purchases features
a decision lag of one year ahead. All simulations use the same series of aggregate shocks.
Table 5 compares the business cycle moments of government purchases from the baseline
speciﬁcationwiththosefrommodelsthatdonotgeneratedecoupling. Modelswitheitheralack
of realistic economic inequality (independently of the extent of political inequality) – the ‘De-
17The model overshoots, but GND is one of the least persistent government purchases aggregates. Had we cali-
brated toG, as we do in Section 4.2, we would have matched the high persistence almost perfectly.
21term. ¯’-column in the table – or with a lack of political inequality (independently of whether
theyfeaturerealisticeconomicinequality)–theÂÆ0-columninthetable–behaveintheaggre-
gate essentially like representative agent versions of the model without any heterogeneity and
inequality–the‘Rep. AgentNoLag’-columninthetable. Thisﬁndingisvalidforothermoments
andotheraggregatevariablesnotshowninTable5. Wethusprovideanothercaseofirrelevance
of wealth heterogeneity for aggregate dynamics – government purchases dynamics, to be pre-
cise –, extending the ﬁnding of Krusell and Smith (1998) to a class of models with endogenous
public policy. However, once both types of heterogeneity are combined, they matter for the
aggregate dynamics of government purchases. Because of this, government purchases dynam-
ics provide important restrictions on a difﬁcult-to-measure structural parameter, namely the
wealth bias in the political system, which suggests that future empirical research might beneﬁt
from taking these dynamics into account. Only the baseline model with both economic and
political inequality generates the right level of procyclicality of government purchases. With a
ﬁxed discount factor, economic inequality is too small to matter. While the ‘Determ. ¯’-case
with lower wealth inequality has a negative relationship between wealth bias and the comove-
mentofGDPandgovernmentpurchases, thegradientissmall. WithÂÆ0, economicinequality
does not get translated into political inequality.
Table 5 also shows that the speciﬁcation with both types of inequality has other important
moments closer to the data, in particular the correlation of government purchases with private
consumption and the persistence of government purchases. Only in the baseline speciﬁcation
is G the most persistent component of aggregate demand. This is consistent with the fact that
government purchases dynamics now depend directly on a slow-moving and itself persistent
object, the wealth distribution.
The baseline model is the only one with the right relative size between the contemporane-
ous and the dynamic correlation of G and GDP. However, this could be an artifact of us not
allowing for decision and implementation lags in the political process. In order to test, whether
the excess synchronization in the representative agent model is an artifact of abstracting from
such lags, we simulated a version of the representative household economy, where the political
process decides about next period’s government purchases, making current government pur-
chases an additional state variable of the economy. As Table 5 in the ‘Rep. Agent Lag’-column
shows, this solves the problem of the contemporaneous correlation of government purchases
with GDP, now at 0.43, which is close to the 0.47 in the data. But this comes, perhaps not sur-
prisingly, at the cost of an oversynchronization (relative to the data) with lagged output.
Next, we show in Table 6 that the degree of wealth-bias that is most in line with aggregate
government purchases dynamics is also consistent with the average degree of political inequal-
ity as measured by the incidence of campaign contributions across the income percentiles in
22the American National Election Studies (ANES). We compare the weight-shares in the social
welfare function when Â Æ 0.55 to the campaign contribution shares in the ANES data. It is
apparent that the political bias towards high income agents in our model at least broadly lines
up with the political bias exhibited in the measured campaign contribution shares. Relative to
these, our baseline calibration exhibits slightly larger political inequality. Since these measured
campaign contribution shares do not take into account the size of the contributions made by
the different income groups, they almost surely understate political inequality.
Table 6: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION PER INCOME GROUP - BASELINE SIMULATION - ÂÆ0.55
Income Percentile [0¡16%] [17¡33%] [34¡67%] [68¡95%] [96¡100%]
Weight shares - Baseline Model 2.9% 7.2% 25.7% 41.8% 22.4%
Campaign contribution shares 5.0% 8.1% 27.5% 41.9% 17.5%
Notes: ‘Weight shares’ refers to the (time-averaged) weight shares in the social welfare function for each income
percentile. ‘Campaign contribution shares’ are the average fractions of campaign contributors that belong to a
certain percentile of the income distribution. Data source is the American National Election Studies. See Table 2
in Section 2.2.
We ﬁnish this section by showing that the decoupling we ﬁnd in the simulations with suf-
ﬁcient economic and political inequality is caused by a shift of political power for agents over
the business cycle. Figure 4 shows that the average desiredG increases with wealth and income
quintiles. Figure5istheanalogtoTable3inSection2.2. JustlikeintheAmericanNationalElec-
tion Studies data, the relative political inﬂuence of the poor increases in good economic times,
whereas the rich lose some of their weight in the political decision process. In good economic
times the poor have slightly more say and they want on average lower government purchases,
which mitigates the expansion of G in a boom. Figure 5 also shows that only mild procyclical-
ity of the political inﬂuence of the poor and mild countercyclicality of the political inﬂuence of
the rich, consistent with the data, are required to generate the extent of decoupling observed in
aggregate government purchases.
23Figure 4: Desired Government Purchases per Wealth/Income Quintile




















































Notes: We use the simulation with ÂÆ0.55 and µ Æ0.815. We compute for each of the NH Æ60,000 agents at every
point in the simulation their desired level of government purchases, using their indirect net present value utility
function over government purchases, Ji. With this we can compute the conditional averages of desired govern-
ment purchases per wealth or income quintile. We normalize these conditional means by the level of aggregate
output at that point in time. The ﬁgure plots the time averages of these numbers.
Figure 5: Cyclicality of Political Inﬂuence per Wealth/Income Quintile as a Function of the
Wealth Bias




















































































or income quintile. We then compute for each wealth or income quintile’s weight share the contemporaneous
correlation coefﬁcients with model simulated output, which is logged and ﬁltered with a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
with smoothing parameter 100.
244.2 Robustness
In this section we discuss robustness of our results with respect to one calibration choice and
onemodelingchoicewehavemadeinourbaselinecase. Thereweusegovernmentnondefense
purchases as a proxy for endogenous government purchases. It is not obvious that all defense
governmentspendingisorthogonaltothestateoftheeconomy. Thisseemsespeciallyplausible
for military spending in peace times. In fact, Table 7 in Appendix B suggests that, if anything,
federal defense expenditures are somewhat more correlated with the cycle than federal nonde-
fense expenditures.
Figure 6: Correlation Between Y and G as a Function of Wealth Bias - Calibration to Total Gov-
ernment Purchases


















































No Gini in KS rule
Deterministic β
Deterministic β − No Gini in KS rule
Notes: see notes to ﬁgure 3.
Therefore, we repeat our baseline exercise, but calibrate the weight of government pur-
chases, µ, to match the G
Y -ratio based on total government consumption and investment ex-
penditures, G, including defense spending: 22.5%. Figure 6 shows the equivalent of Figure 3
in Section 4.2, when we use G as our data counterpart. It can again be seen that higher polit-
ical bias leads to a decoupling of government purchases and the aggregate economy. For the
‘total government purchases’-calibration the contemporaneous correlation between GDP and




majority voting as the political constitution with vote allocation for type (k,²,¯) equal to (kÅ)Â.
25As in a standard majority voting environment, the policy with ﬁfty percent of the votes will be
the winner if the preference of every household is single-peaked.18















. Then the Cordorcet winner in a weighted majority voting system is
















Figure7: CorrelationBetweenY andG asaFunctionofWealthBias-Wealth-weightedMajority
Voting



















































No Gini in KS rule
Deterministic β
Deterministic β − No Gini in KS rule
Notes: see notes to ﬁgure 3.
Figure 7 repeats our exercises for the case of majority voting, where again higher political
bias yields decoupling of government purchases and the aggregate economy. For the majority
voting case the slope of the decline of the contemporaneous correlation coefﬁcient between
output and government purchases in Â is much ﬂatter initially and much steeper for higher
values of Â, compared to the social welfare function case. The contemporaneous correlation
between GDP and government purchases is approximately matched at ÂÆ0.79.
18In the voting literature, there are different sufﬁcient conditions to guarantee the existence of the voting equi-
librium, e.g., single-peakedness, intermediate preference and single crossing (or equivalently order restriction)
conditions (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, for an overview). Although there are general existence results for
the complete-market neoclassical growth model with policy commitment(see Bassetto and Benhabib, 2006), we
are not aware of similar results applicable to our environment. Nevertheless, we verify numerically that single-
peakedness is satisﬁed in our simulations.
265 Final Remarks
Thispaperprovidesaquantitativetheoryoftheimplicationsofeconomicandpoliticalinequal-
ity for the business cycle comovement of government purchases. We show that with both types
of inequality present in a quantitatively realistic way, the interaction of government purchases
being a normal good and countercyclical political inequality can alter the cyclicality of govern-
ment purchases compared to models where either type of inequality is missing. An extreme
case of the latter is a representative agent environment. We argue that in standard models the
procyclicality of government purchases may be dampened in the presence of economic and
economically-based political inequality. This ﬁnding does not depend on the speciﬁcs of the
political system, nor the average importance of the government sector in the economy. In con-
trast, standard neoclassical representative agent models of endogenous public policy feature
strong procyclicality of government purchases. We thus provide an example of a quantitatively
realistic model, where heterogeneity matters for aggregate dynamics, speciﬁcally the dynam-
ics of government purchases. We leave it for future research to understand the business cycle
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30A Proofs - Appendix
Proof of proposition 1: Substitute the budget constraint (4) for private consumption in (1), use























by strict concavity of u1.
For
@FOC(G,z,k)
















































































Proof of proposition 2: Substituting the budget constraint into the expected utility function,
suppressing the arguments of w (K,L,z), r (K,L,z) and ¿(K,L,z,G) as well as their analogs to-













The expectation is taken with respect to z0 and ²0. We consider now the effects of an exogenous
increase in today’s real wage keeping constant tomorrow’s factor prices. Speciﬁcally, we are
interested in how the marginal effect of real wage increases on the saving decision is impacted
by individual capital holdings.
First we show that
@FOC(k0,w,k)
@w È 0, which means, given the concavity of u1, that real wage















































































if u1(¢)000 È 0. Furthermore, it is easy to show that d k0
d k È 0, which means that, in a group of
agents with the same labor productivity, saving as a function of individual capital holdings is
increasing, whereas marginal saving with respect to the real wage is decreasing in individual
capital holdings.
32Next assume that a group of agents with the same labor productivity is ordered according









Notice that the expression in the numerator of this derivative is the Lorenz curve of second-
period capital holdings. We will show that under the stated assumptions and in partial equilib-
rium the Lorenz curve increases pointwise for each ﬁxed i¤, and thus inequality decreases in






















































Given the results from above that saving and marginal saving with respect to the real wage
are inversely related in a group of agents with the same labor productivity and the only source
of heterogeneity being different individual capital holdings, it is clear that the two factors of
the second product are both positive, but smaller than the corresponding factors in the ﬁrst
product. This ﬁnishes the proof.
Of course, in general equilibrium, changes in the real wage today could only be brought
aboutbychangesintheinitialcapitalstock,thelaborendowment,or,mostrealistically,through
a change in aggregate productivity, which would then - through the aggregation of the saving
decisions - change tomorrow’s aggregate capital holdings and thus factor prices. We ignore
these general equilibrium effects here, only then do we get clear analytical results.
But even a more general partial equilibrium statement with respect to a proportional ex-
ogenous increase in both the real wage and the real interest rate ignoring aggregate saving is
not possible. The reason for this can be seen by analogy from (¤), where for d k0





(1¡¿)k. Then the cross derivative d2 k0
d rd k would
feature an additional term, where the (negative) second derivative of the utility function multi-
plies the (negative) denominator in (¤). This means that the total effect cannot be signed, even
in a simple two-period model. And this, in turn, justiﬁes our use of numerical techniques.
33B Data - Appendix
Figure 8: Cyclicality of Government Purchases By State




























































Correlation Between  Real State G and  Real State GDP
Notes: ‘Real State G’ is real GDP from the total government sector in the regional NIPA data. ‘Real State GDP per







































Notes: see notes to Figure 8.
34Table 7: BUSINESS CYCLE FACTS FOR DISAGGREGATE GOVERNMENT PURCHASES
Moment Correl. w. Y Correl. w. Y-Lag. Correl. w. C Autocorrel. Frac. of G
1st-order
G 0.35 0.51 0.35 0.79 100.0%
GC 0.26 0.43 0.30 0.78 84.6%
GI 0.47 0.59 0.39 0.75 15.6%
GND 0.48 0.58 0.49 0.74 68.8%
GNDC 0.19 0.34 0.38 0.70 56.5%
GNDI 0.60 0.66 0.47 0.74 12.0%
GF 0.15 0.27 0.11 0.82 42.7%
GFC 0.12 0.25 0.09 0.82 38.3%
GFI 0.18 0.28 0.10 0.73 5.0%
GFD 0.13 0.26 0.13 0.83 31.2%
GFDC 0.13 0.24 0.12 0.85 28.0%
GFDI 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.71 3.6%
GFND 0.04 -0.01 -0.12 0.63 11.7%
GFNDC -0.09 -0.04 -0.20 0.47 10.3%
GFNDI 0.27 0.03 0.06 0.71 1.5%
GSL 0.49 0.65 0.59 0.76 57.1%
GSLC 0.24 0.39 0.48 0.77 46.3%
GSLI 0.62 0.73 0.52 0.72 10.7%
GS 0.40 0.65 0.47 0.72 18.4%
GSC 0.10 0.41 0.27 0.73 14.0%
GSI 0.57 0.62 0.55 0.69 4.2%
GL 0.49 0.58 0.58 0.70 38.7%
GLC 0.27 0.30 0.51 0.70 32.2%
GLI 0.52 0.65 0.39 0.70 6.5%
G ¡Empl. 0.26 0.62 0.20 0.75 -
Notes: G denotes government consumption and gross investment expenditures, a C in an acronym means con-
sumption, an I investment. D stands for defense spending, ND for nondefense. F means federal government, SL
the aggregate of state and local governments. S stands for the state level and L for the local level. G¡Empl. means
government employment. All variables are annual, they range from 1960-2006. Categories G until GSLI are de-
ﬂated by their corresponding deﬂators. For the separate state and local level data NIPA does not publish separate
price indices. We therefore use the aggregate state and local price deﬂator for GS and GL, and the consumption-
and investment-speciﬁc aggregate state and local price deﬂator for GSC/GLC and GSI/GLI, respectively. For
columns 2-5 all data are logged and ﬁltered with a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 100. The last
column shows the fraction of each component of government purchases in totalG. Sources: Tables 3.9.4 and 3.9.5
from the NIPA accounts forG untilGSLI. The separate data for the state and local level come from Tables 3.20 and
3.21 from the NIPA accounts. Government employment data are from the BLS.
35Table 8: BUSINESS CYCLE FACTS FOR DISAGGREGATE GOVERNMENT PURCHASES - ACCORDING
TO FUNCTION
Moment Correl. w. Y Correl. w. Y-Lag. Correl. w. C Autocorrel. Frac. of G
1st-order
General public service 0.10 0.17 0.38 0.69 8.3%
National defense 0.12 0.26 0.13 0.83 29.8%
Public order and safety 0.05 0.33 0.21 0.56 9.1%
Economic affairs 0.37 0.35 0.22 0.72 16.4%
Transportation 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.66 10.0%
Space 0.15 0.07 -0.06 0.83 1.1%
Other economic affairs 0.00 0.10 -0.08 0.28 5.2%
Housing and comm. serv. 0.22 0.47 0.13 0.41 2.3%
Health -0.29 -0.03 -0.19 0.76 4.5%
Recreation and culture 0.03 0.37 0.19 0.61 1.4%
Education 0.51 0.58 0.58 0.79 25.5%
Income security 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.45 2.9%
F-General public service -0.25 -0.10 -0.12 0.54 2.1%
F-National defense 0.12 0.26 0.13 0.83 29.8%
F-Public order and safety 0.06 -0.15 0.17 0.41 0.9%
F-Economic affairs 0.11 0.03 -0.10 0.61 5.0%
F-Transportation -0.20 -0.21 -0.15 0.42 1.2%
F-Space 0.15 0.07 -0.06 0.83 1.1%
F-Other economic affairs -0.10 -0.06 -0.15 0.17 2.7%
F-Health -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.33 2.4%
F-Recreation and culture 0.06 0.17 0.03 0.39 0.2%
F-Education 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.31 0.3%
F-Income security -0.09 -0.04 -0.29 0.29 0.6%
SL-General public service 0.26 0.28 0.52 0.68 6.3%
SL-Public order and safety 0.08 0.40 0.22 0.51 8.2%
SL-Economic affairs 0.54 0.58 0.49 0.70 11.4%
SL-Transportation 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.68 8.9%
SL-Other economic affairs 0.32 0.53 0.21 0.54 2.5%
SL-Housing and comm. serv. 0.26 0.50 0.16 0.41 2.2%
SL-Health -0.30 -0.01 -0.27 0.70 2.1%
SL-Recreation and culture 0.05 0.45 0.21 0.55 01.2%
SL-Education 0.50 0.58 0.58 0.80 25.2%
SL-Elementary and second. 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.78 20.5%
SL-Higher 0.46 0.54 0.49 0.63 3.9%
SL-Libraries and other 0.35 0.55 0.45 0.65 1.0%
SL-Income security 0.09 0.16 0.33 0.70 2.3%
Notes: see notes to Table 7. All variables are deﬂated by their corresponding deﬂators. Sources: Tables 3.15.4 and
3.15.5 from the NIPA accounts.
36Figure10: TheCorrelationBetweenStates’GDPPerCapitaandGovernmentPurchases-Variant
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NIPA Data − Correlation=0.39





















Notes: ‘Real State G’ in the upper panel is real GDP from the total government sector in the regional NIPA data.
‘Real State G’ in the lower panel is the sum of the expenditures on ‘Total Current Operations’ and ‘Total Capital
Outlays’ from the historical data of the census of state government ﬁnances, deﬂated by the state-speciﬁc implicit
deﬂator for government GDP from the NIPA data. ‘Real State GDP per capita’ is real GDP from the regional NIPA
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ﬁnances, deﬂated by the state-speciﬁc implicit deﬂator for government GDP from the NIPA data. There are no
state-speciﬁc deﬂators for consumption and investment expenditures separately. ‘Real State GDP per capita’ is
real GDP from the regional NIPA data. All data are averaged across time. These averaged ‘Real State G’ data are
regressed on the state’s total surface and population. The residuals of these regressions are displayed against ‘Real
State GDP per capita’.
38C A Probabilistic Voting Interpretation - Appendix
As in the standard probabilistic voting environment, there are two political candidates compet-
ing for ofﬁce. Both candidate A and B are ofﬁce-seeking with the only objective to maximize
their probability of winning. The politicians live for one period and hence are static decision
makers. But they have to take into account the dynamic utility of the voters to maximize their
winning probability.
Following Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), we introduce an idiosyncratic, ¾, and an aggregate,
d, element of uncertainty in the political dimension. Both ¾ and d are uniformly distributed













and d represent the political advantage of candidate B relative to candidate A. With this new
political dimension every voter i j is identiﬁed by (ki,²i,¯i,¾j). More speciﬁcally, ¾j can be
interpreted as the realized idiosyncratic “ideology” advantage parameter, for example utility
towards issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, etc. d is interpreted as the aggregate “popu-
larity” parameter, for example personal charisma, etc. Both ¾ and d are known to the voters,
but they are not known to the politicians. Since ¾ is a purely idiosyncratic component, it does
not introduce any de facto uncertainty from the point of view of candidates. But d presents
true uncertainty for political candidates, which is a crucial mechanism in a probabilistic voting
model.
The felicity function of household i j under policy of the candidate B (GB) is assumed to be
U (ci,GB)Å¾j Åd.
Taking expectations over future felicity streams and using the iid nature of ¾ and d, yields the










. Given any value of d (which is
unknown to the candidate), the “swing voter” within an economic type (ki,²i,¯i) is associated













, s 2{A,B}. Anypoliticaltypewithineconomictype(ki,²i,¯i)
with ¾j Ç ˆ ¾i will vote for policy GA and vice versa. As a result, the vote share for candidate A
19The i.i.d. assumption simpliﬁes the analysis. For a general characterization of dynamic probabilistic voting
models with persistent shocks, see Battaglini (2010).









i )Â denote the number of votes allocated to each member of economic group
(ki,²i,¯i). In a standard one-person-one-vote system, ¸(ki) Æ 1. In a one-dollar-one-vote sys-
tem, ¸(ki)ÆkÅ
i .





















































Because of the separability of Ji
A and Ji
B, for any GB, a dominant strategy for candidate A





i.e., a utilitarian social welfare function with weighting parameters (kÅ
i )Â. By symmetry, type B
maximizesthesamesocialwelfarefunction. Consequently,bothcandidateswillsharethesame
objective and propose the same policy.
40D Computational Algorithm - Appendix
Algorithm 3 Fixed Point Iteration on (H,ª)
Step 0: Select a set of summary statistics of the wealth distribution (K,Gini(k)) and ﬁx the func-










. Set up a convergence criterion ".
Step 1: In step n, imposing (Hn,ªn) in the best-response optimization problem, use value func-
tion iteration to solve for the household’s parametric dynamic programming problem. Get the
continuation value function vn¡
k,²,¯,¡,z;ªn,Hn¢
.
























































, with a total sample size of T (1ÅNG).




0,..., b e an
4},{b bn
0,...,b bn
2}, which with a slight abuse of notation we summarize as
¡
b Hn, b ªn¢
. Notice that obviously b Hn is updated on both the on- and off-equilibrium paths, b ªn
only on the on-equilibrium path.
Step 5: If jHn ¡ b HnjÇ" and jªn ¡ b ªnjÇ", stop. Otherwise, set
HnÅ1 Æ ®H £ b Hn Å(1¡®H)£Hn,
ªnÅ1 Æ ®ª£ b ªn Å(1¡®ª)£ªn,
with ®H,®ª 2(0,1], and go to step 1.
Step 6: Check whether the R2 of the ﬁnal OLS regressions are high enough to convey conﬁdence
that the true equilibrium rule is well approximated. Otherwise go to step 0. 20.
20We chose " Æ 10¡4, NH Æ 60,000, T Æ 1,500, of which we discard the ﬁrst 500, when we update the KS-rules
or compute summary statistics. Following Krusell and Smith (1998), we also make sure that these 60,000 agents
are always distributed according to the stationary distributions of the Markov chains that govern ² and ¯, and thus
avoid introducing artiﬁcial aggregate uncertainty owing to the small deviation from the law of large numbers. To
eliminate sampling error, we use the same series of aggregate shocks for all iterations and all model simulations.
41E Calibration - Appendix
Table 9: COMMON PARAMETERS
Parameter ± ® k
Value 0.1 0.36 -0.01
Table 10: MARKOV CHAIN: AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
State z1 z2 z3 z4 z5
Value 0.9182 0.9582 1 1.0436 1.0891
z1 0.6306 0.3676 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000
z2 0.0382 0.7538 0.2077 0.0003 0.0000
z3 0.0001 0.0980 0.8039 0.0980 0.0001
z4 0.0000 0.0003 0.2077 0.7538 0.0382
z5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.3676 0.6306
Notes: This Markov chain is based on an autocorrelation coefﬁcient of 0.8145 and conditional standard deviation
of 0.0165. It was generated with Tauchen’s (see Tauchen, 1986) discretization method and a width-parameter of 3.
42Table 11: MARKOV CHAIN: IDIOSYNCRATIC LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
State ²1 ²2 ²3 ²4 ²5 ²6 ²7 ²8 ²9
Value 0.4420 0.5421 0.6648 0.8154 1 1.2264 1.5041 1.8447 2.2623
²1 0.2854 0.4292 0.2409 0.0422 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
²2 0.0782 0.3102 0.4140 0.1739 0.0227 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
²3 0.0117 0.1167 0.3716 0.3716 0.1167 0.0113 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
²4 0.0009 0.0227 0.1739 0.4140 0.3102 0.0728 0.0053 0.0001 0.0000
²5 0.0000 0.0023 0.0422 0.2409 0.4292 0.2409 0.0422 0.0023 0.0000
²6 0.0000 0.0001 0.0053 0.0728 0.3102 0.4140 0.1739 0.0227 0.0009
²7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0113 0.1167 0.3716 0.3716 0.1167 0.0117
²8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0227 0.1739 0.4140 0.3102 0.0782
²9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.0422 0.2409 0.4292 0.2854
Notes: This Markov chain is based on an autocorrelation coefﬁcient of 0.75 and conditional standard deviation of
0.18. It was generated with Tauchen’s (see Tauchen, 1986) discretization method and a width-parameter of 3.
Table 12: MARKOV CHAIN: DISCOUNT FACTOR
State ¯1 ¯2 ¯3
Value 0.94 0.96 0.98
¯1 0.9800 0.0200 0
¯2 0.0025 0.9950 0.0025
¯3 0 0.0200 0.9800
The calibration of µ:
Baseline case and its three variants: [Â Æ 0,µ Æ 0.78], [Â Æ 0.1,µ Æ 0.79], [Â Æ 0.2,µ Æ 0.795], [Â Æ
0.3,µ Æ 0.805], [Â Æ 0.4,µ Æ 0.81], [Â Æ 0.5,µ Æ 0.815], [Â Æ 0.55,µ Æ 0.82], [Â Æ 0.6,µ Æ 0.82],[Â Æ
0.7,µ Æ0.83], [ÂÆ0.8,µ Æ0.84],[ÂÆ0.9,µ Æ0.85],[ÂÆ1.0,µ Æ0.86].
Representative agent case: no lag: µ Æ0.78, lag: µ Æ0.785.
‘G
Y Æ 0.225’-case and its three variants: [Â Æ 0,µ Æ 0.665], [Â Æ 0.1,µ Æ 0.675], [Â Æ 0.2,µ Æ 0.68],
[Â Æ 0.3,µ Æ 0.69], [Â Æ 0.4,µ Æ 0.70], [Â Æ 0.5,µ Æ 0.705], [Â Æ 0.6,µ Æ 0.715],[Â Æ 0.65,µ Æ
0.72],[ÂÆ0.7,µ Æ0.725],[ÂÆ0.8,µ Æ0.735],[ÂÆ0.9,µ Æ0.745],[ÂÆ1.0,µ Æ0.76].
‘Majority voting’-case and its three variants: [Â Æ 0,µ Æ 0.76], [Â Æ 0.1,µ Æ 0.765], [Â Æ 0.2,µ Æ
0.77], [Â Æ 0.3,µ Æ 0.775], [Â Æ 0.4,µ Æ 0.78], [Â Æ 0.5,µ Æ 0.785], [Â Æ 0.6,µ Æ 0.795],[Â Æ 0.7,µ Æ
0.805],[Â Æ 0.75,µ Æ 0.815],[Â Æ 0.79,µ Æ 0.82],[Â Æ 0.8,µ Æ 0.82],[Â Æ 0.9,µ Æ 0.835],[Â Æ 1.0,µ Æ
0.85].
43F Numerics - Appendix
Table 13: KRUSELL-SMITH RULES FOR AVERAGE CAPITAL - EQUATION(9)
z a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 R2
Baseline Case, µ Æ0.815, ÂÆ0.55
z1 -0.2873 0.9079 0.0354 -0.1754 -0.0233 0.9994
z2 -0.2685 0.9024 0.0256 -0.1707 -0.0227 0.9995
z3 -0.2502 0.8972 0.0199 -0.1670 -0.0222 0.9995
z4 -0.2265 0.8941 0.0202 -0.1611 -0.0215 0.9995
z5 -0.1999 0.8976 0.0362 -0.1554 -0.0207 0.9995
Baseline Case, µ Æ0.815, ÂÆ0.55, No Gini
z1 -0.2958 0.8959 - -0.1764 -0.0234 0.9994
z2 -0.2749 0.8941 - -0.1717 -0.0228 0.9995
z3 -0.2550 0.8897 - -0.1679 -0.0223 0.9994
z4 -0.2309 0.8859 - -0.1618 -0.0215 0.9995
z5 -0.2068 0.8819 - -0.1559 -0.0208 0.9994
Representative Agent Case - No Lags
z1 -0.4495 0.9102 - -0.2698 -0.0397 0.9994
z2 -0.4188 0.9061 - -0.2589 -0.0381 0.9994
z3 -0.3916 0.9017 - -0.2503 -0.0368 0.9994
z4 -0.3595 0.8981 - -0.2389 -0.0351 0.9995
z5 -0.3288 0.8941 - -0.2289 -0.0337 0.9995
G-calibration, µ Æ0.72, ÂÆ0.65
z1 -0.3810 0.9167 0.0369 -0.2509 -0.0366 0.9996
z2 -0.3578 0.9113 0.0286 -0.2434 -0.0356 0.9995
z3 -0.3358 0.9056 0.0233 -0.2373 -0.0347 0.9995
z4 -0.3062 0.9019 0.0236 -0.2273 -0.0333 0.9995
z5 -0.2747 0.9032 0.0354 -0.2182 -0.0319 0.9996
Majority Voting Case, µ Æ0.82, ÂÆ0.79
z1 -0.2834 0.9091 0.0460 -0.1749 -0.0232 0.9994
z2 -0.2655 0.9023 0.0328 -0.1702 -0.0226 0.9995
z3 -0.2479 0.8960 0.0236 -0.1665 -0.0222 0.9995
z4 -0.2246 0.8923 0.0218 -0.1604 -0.0214 0.9995
z5 -0.1977 0.8962 0.0388 -0.1546 -0.0206 0.9995
Notes: z denotes aggregate productivity, which can achieve ﬁve discrete states: z1 to z5, Table 10 in Appendix E. The KS equation for average




44Table 14: KRUSELL-SMITH RULES FOR Gini(k) - EQUATION(10)
z e a0 e a1 e a2 e a3 e a4 R2
Baseline Case, µ Æ0.815, ÂÆ0.55
z1 0.1215 0.0266 0.9778 0.0741 0.0096 0.9995
z2 0.1168 0.0230 0.9724 0.0744 0.0097 0.9993
z3 0.1145 0.0257 0.9807 0.0747 0.0098 0.9994
z4 0.1127 0.0327 1.0013 0.0739 0.0097 0.9994
z5 0.1060 0.0348 1.0049 0.0726 0.0096 0.9993
G-calibration, µ Æ0.72, ÂÆ0.65
z1 0.1582 0.0213 0.9755 0.1047 0.0147 0.9997
z2 0.1536 0.0179 0.9712 0.1059 0.0150 0.9995
z3 0.1508 0.0201 0.9783 0.1063 0.0152 0.9995
z4 0.1477 0.0267 0.9968 0.1047 0.0151 0.9995
z5 0.1409 0.0313 1.0056 0.1027 0.0148 0.9995
Majority Voting Case, µ Æ0.82, ÂÆ0.79
z1 0.1186 0.0257 0.9694 0.0739 0.0096 0.9994
z2 0.1144 0.0233 0.9668 0.0740 0.0096 0.9993
z3 0.1126 0.0268 0.9779 0.0742 0.0097 0.9993
z4 0.1117 0.0348 1.0021 0.0733 0.0096 0.9994
z5 0.1050 0.0367 1.0059 0.0719 0.0095 0.9993
Notes: z denotesaggregateproductivity,whichcanachieveﬁvediscretestates: z1 to z5,Table10inAppendixE. The
KSequationforthenaturallogarithmoftheGinicoefﬁcientofcapitalisgivenby: logGini(k0)Æ e a0(z)Åe a1(z)logKÅ




45Table 15: KRUSELL-SMITH RULES FOR GOVERNMENT PURCHASES - EQUATION(11)
z b0 b1 b2 R2
Baseline Case, µ Æ0.815, ÂÆ0.55
z1 -2.5786 0.6471 0.2629 0.9961
z2 -2.5707 0.6794 0.2993 0.9983
z3 -2.5745 0.6866 0.2673 0.9984
z4 -2.5947 0.6701 0.1741 0.9991
z5 -2.6108 0.6159 0.0540 0.9994
Baseline Case, µ Æ0.815, ÂÆ0.55, No Gini
z1 -2.6105 0.5574 - 0.9854
z2 -2.6073 0.5726 - 0.9928
z3 -2.6000 0.5726 - 0.9940
z4 -2.5974 0.5803 - 0.9968
z5 -2.5870 0.5667 - 0.9990
Representative Agent Case - No Lags
z1 -2.6424 0.4910 - 1.0000
z2 -2.6205 0.4901 - 1.0000
z3 -2.5985 0.4867 - 1.0000
z4 -2.5751 0.4878 - 1.0000
z5 -2.5527 0.4904 - 1.0000
G-calibration, µ Æ0.72, ÂÆ0.65
z1 -2.1162 0.6137 0.3288 0.9982
z2 -2.1142 0.6410 0.3349 0.9991
z3 -2.1197 0.6536 0.2986 0.9992
z4 -2.1372 0.6546 0.2313 0.9995
z5 -2.1631 0.6030 0.1069 0.9997
Majority Voting Case, µ Æ0.82, ÂÆ0.79
z1 -2.3470 0.6667 1.0967 0.8959
z2 -2.3941 0.6263 0.8867 0.9457
z3 -2.4863 0.5231 0.4543 0.9594
z4 -2.5528 0.4593 0.1591 0.9722
z5 -2.5808 0.3989 -0.0098 0.9829
Notes: z denotes aggregate productivity, which can achieve ﬁve discrete states: z1 to z5, Table 10 in Appendix E.
The KS equation for government purchases is given by: logG Æb0(z)Åb1(z)logK Åb2(z)logGini(k).
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